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Abstract
Our study explores the impact of selection criteria on the costs and benefits of early
childcare for mothers’ employment, child development, and municipalities’ rev-
enues by exploiting the selection criteria of different Italian municipalities in assign-
ing childcare slots. In Italy, only around 13% of the demand for public childcare
coverage is met, and the number of applications exceeds the number of places in
childcare services in all regions. In conditions of excess demand, municipalities
introduce selection criteria to give priority to families for whom access to public
childcare appears to be more valuable. We analyse through simulations the conse-
quences of introducing different selection criteria, using a representative Italian
sample of households with children under 3 years of age (European Survey on
Living and Income Conditions), and the selection criteria employed by six represen-
tative Italian municipalities. Our results have interesting policy implications. The
benefits for child outcomes and mothers’ employment are stronger in municipalities
where the selection criteria give priority to more disadvantaged households.
However, in these contexts, selected households are less able to contribute to the fi-
nancial sustainability of the service.
Key words: childcare, mothers’ employment, child development
1. Introduction
Over the past few years, economic studies have given greater attention to the role of early
childcare for children under 3 years of age, and its potential impact on mothers’ employ-
ment and child development. Most of these studies have focused on Europe, where public
childcare services are more prevalent than private services. In most European countries,
governments are directly involved in the provision of childcare services, while the supply
from the private sector is very limited. However, there are still pronounced differences in
childcare provision between countries. While northern European countries, such as
Denmark and Norway, have universal public childcare, southern European countries have
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a mixed childcare supply provided by both the private and the public sectors. In these coun-
tries, public childcare availability is very limited, and is still far below the target of 33% set
by the Barcelona European Council (European Union, 2002).
The existing literature on this issue has focused on two important characteristics of
childcare: availability and costs. Our research extends the analysis to include another im-
portant characteristic of childcare that has been less explored: the selection criteria used by
local governments in assigning slots. In this study, we consider the case of Italy, where only
around 13% of children under 3 years of age attend public childcare, and the number of ap-
plications exceeds the number of slots in childcare services in all regions (ISTAT, 2010).
Given this excess demand, the municipality sets eligibility criteria for selecting the families
for whom public childcare access appears to be more valuable.1
While the selection criteria appear to be similar from one municipality to another, the
importance (and therefore the points) each municipality gives to each family characteristic
varies. Thus, different types of households would ideally have access to childcare services in
different municipalities. The main selection criteria include family composition (whether
the household is led by a single parent and the number of siblings), parents’ working status
(whether they are employed or unemployed), and the social conditions of the families
(whether they suffer from health problems or social exclusion). The selection criteria
adopted by the municipalities and the different types of families selected may have signifi-
cant consequences for households, children, and the municipalities themselves. On the one
hand, the use of certain criteria can support maternal employment and promote early child-
hood education, especially among children from more disadvantaged family backgrounds.
On the other hand, the use of these criteria can lead to a reduction in monetary revenues
for the municipality, as households vary in their financial ability to pay fees.2
The aim of our article is to explore the costs and benefits of introducing different selec-
tion criteria for a given society using a sample of households with children aged less than 3
years, and the selection criteria applied by six municipalities (Turin, Milan, Bologna,
Reggio Emilia, Rome, and Naples).
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the literature that has
analysed the impact of early childcare on child development and maternal labour market
participation. In Section 3, we describe the main characteristics of the Italian childcare sys-
tem. In Section 4, we present the data used and the simulation methods. We simulate how
the selection criteria used by six large Italian municipalities in assigning the available child-
care slots lead to different groups of children having access to care. We then explore the dif-
ferent levels of benefits for a given society. We summarize our conclusions in Section 5.
2. Previous Studies on the Role of Early Childcare
A large number of studies have analysed the impacts of childcare access on mothers’ labour
supply and on child outcomes. The most important characteristics of childcare considered
in these studies are availability and cost. In countries where the childcare services are pro-
vided at the private level, like in the USA and the UK, the focus is on the cost of the services;
1 We will refer to the selection process that operates through the eligibility criteria set by each
municipality as ‘rationing’.
2 Fees are assessed based on the financial situation of the family.
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while in countries where the provision is mostly public, like in Sweden, Norway, Germany,
and Italy, the focus is on the availability of services rather than on the cost.
A first stream of research has focused on the impact of childcare characteristics on
mothers’ labour supply.3 Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) analysed the case of Sweden,
investigating the impact of childcare costs and availability on maternal employment. They
found that in regions where childcare is more widespread, childcare costs affect the prob-
ability that mothers will participate in the labour market; whereas in areas where childcare
is ‘rationed’, there is little evidence of significant price effects. Del Boca and Vuri (2007)
analysed the effect of childcare costs on mothers’ employment in the Italian context, taking
into account the effect of rationing in the provision of care. Their results also indicated that
availability has a greater impact than costs. Other studies from Germany reached similar
conclusions (Wrohlich, 2006). In an analysis of the impact of childcare availability across
European countries, Del Boca et al. (2009) found that childcare availability has a positive
effect on the probability of employment among women at all levels of education, but that
the effect is stronger for less educated women.
Another stream of literature has extended the analysis of the impact of childcare on
child outcomes.4 Many of these studies have found positive implications of attending child-
care for child development, especially among children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Felfe and Lalive (2014) estimated the impact of having attended childcare between ages 0
and 2 years in West Germany, and found that children with less educated mothers and chil-
dren of immigrants benefited more in terms of the development of both language and social
skills. The benefits were found to be large enough to close the scholastic achievement gap
between children of high and low socio-economic status, and of native-born and immigrant
parents.
Felfe et al. (2015) evaluated the long-run effects of a policy (implemented in the late
1990s) that introduced universal childcare for 3-year-old children in Spain. They compared
the later cognitive outcomes of children who attended childcare with those of previous co-
horts, and found a sizable increase in reading and math test scores, and a sizable decrease in
the likelihood of falling behind a grade. The results were even more pronounced for chil-
dren from disadvantaged households. Havnes and Mogstad (2011, 2015) evaluated the im-
pact of childcare expansion policies in Norway. They found that the policies had been most
effective in boosting the scholastic achievement levels of children in the lower and median
parts of the income distribution. These findings suggest that childcare policies have effects
across the population, but that the impact of childcare attendance is strongest among chil-
dren from disadvantaged backgrounds, who tend to receive lower levels of human capital
investment from their parents than their more advantaged peers.
Recent research focusing on Italy investigated the heterogeneity of local municipalities’
decisions regarding the supply of childcare. Using INVALSI data, Brilli et al. (2016) ana-
lysed the impact of childcare availability on both mothers’ labour supply and the cognitive
outcomes of children in elementary school. They found that the availability of public child-
care had a positive impact on both. However, their analysis of heterogeneous effects indi-
cated that the childcare availability coefficients were greater in areas with high levels of
rationing.
3 See Del Boca (2015a) and Pronzato and Sorrenti (2015) for surveys of recent studies on the rela-
tionship between childcare and maternal employment.
4 See Del Boca (2015b) for a survey on the impacts of childcare on child outcomes.
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In our work, we extend previous analyses by focusing on the selection criteria used by
local governments in assigning slots to children. We consider the impact of selection criteria
on the society (in terms of mothers’ employment and child development), and find that, as
expected, the benefits are larger for municipalities that give priority to disadvantaged
households. However, since in Italy fees are typically based on household income, munici-
palities that give priority to disadvantaged households face higher costs, as their revenues
are significantly lower.
3. The Characteristics of the Italian Childcare System
In Italy, the decision-making authority for policies related to childcare for children aged
0–3 years is decentralized: the municipality is the main decision-maker, while the regions
define the general management criteria. The central government is only responsible for
defining common objective standards and allocating resources among the regions. This
structure may explain why the availability of public childcare for children aged less than 3
years varies greatly across regions, from around 25% in some areas in the north to under
5% in most of the south (ISTAT, 2014).
From a national perspective, Italy is ranked quite high in the European context for child-
care availability for children aged 3–6 years, but quite low for childcare availability for chil-
dren less than 3 years of age: the utilization rate of public childcare among children aged 3
years and older is 95%, whereas the utilization rate among children less than 3 years of age
is just 13%. The demand for childcare is higher than the supply everywhere in Italy.
However, in regions where public childcare has a longer tradition and is more widespread,
the demand is greater. In general, the northern regions have higher numbers of applicants
and more slots, while the southern regions have fewer slots and lower numbers of appli-
cants (Istituto degli Innocenti, 2006).
In past decades, the role of public childcare was primarily seen as providing care for
children while their parents are at work. Indeed, the main explicit objective of public child-
care has long been to support the labour market participation of mothers. Recently, how-
ever, supporting child development (especially among children from low-income
households) was added as an important objective. This objective has been implemented
through the introduction of quality standards, especially in areas with greater experience
with and longer traditions of childcare provision (such as Emilia Romagna and Tuscany).5
Over the years, there has been some evidence that different ‘models’ of childcare that
give priority to one of the two objectives have evolved.
With an emphasis on the supply side, a municipality’s decision about the number of
childcare slots they will offer depends on their preferences (that is, regarding which types of
household they wish to target) and on their budget constraints. Each municipality estab-
lishes eligibility requirements with the goal of ensuring that the available slots are given to
the households who are likely to benefit the most. While absolute priority is given to the ap-
plications of children with disabilities, the other criteria can be assigned to one of two main
categories. The first category is related to the parents’ employment status: for example,
5 Budget Law 2002, Law 448/2001 (Budget Law 2002) defined formal child care as ‘structures aimed
at granting the development and socialization of girls and boys aged between 3 months and 3 years
and to support families and parents with young children’. Therefore ‘one of the most important
aims of public child care is educational’.
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whether one or both parents work, and whether they work part time or full time. The se-
cond category is related to the family’s structure and socio-economic conditions: for ex-
ample, whether the child is an orphan or a foster child, lives with a single parent, or has
siblings. Thus, according to these access criteria, public childcare can be viewed as a service
that supports families in reconciling work and parenthood during the childbearing years,
and as a service that supports early education and promotes the social inclusion of children
from low-income families.
Both outcomes are particularly important for Italy. On the one hand, nearly 30% of
mothers stop working after the birth of their first child, and the probability of leaving the
labour market after childbirth is higher for less educated mothers and in areas with limited
childcare (Bratti et al., 2005; Pronzato, 2009). In Italy, the employment rate is only 47.3%
among mothers whose youngest child is aged less than 2 years, and 50.6% among mothers
whose youngest child is aged 3–5 years. Thus, having young children appears to play a cru-
cial role in women’s employment. On the other hand, comparative data indicate that
Italian children have long had lower levels of scholastic performance than their peers in
other countries, and, in spite of recent improvements, continue to perform below the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average (PISA-OECD, 2014).
4 Methods and Empirical Analysis
In our article, we assume that the two main objectives of local governments in regulating
the provision of and access to childcare are to support the labour market participation of
women with very young children, and to improve the educational outcomes of the children
who attend public childcare.
The social planner seeks to maximize her objective by using the policy variables at her
disposal, which in this case include the price of a slot relative to the socio-economic condi-
tions of the family applying for the place, and the criteria used to assign slots to children if
the demand for slots exceeds the supply at the price charged.
If the social planner wants to increase maternal employment, she could do so by limiting
access and making maternal employment a more important criterion for access to childcare.
If, however, the social planner’s main goal is to improve the educational outcomes of the
children in this population, she will make the households’ socio-economic conditions a
more important criterion. Viewed in this way, rationing and selective access are outcomes
of a mechanism design implemented by the social planner.
By lowering the price and creating excess demand, the social planner can choose the in-
dividual children who are eligible for the slots, instead of having the ‘market’ select the chil-
dren strictly through the price mechanism.
Since the eligibility requirements vary across local areas, they produce mixed types of
eligible households, with different effects on mothers’ labour supply, child outcomes, and
the monetary contributions of families to the cost of childcare services.
We now present an empirical exercise in which we weight the benefits and the costs of
different selection criteria, and provide a tool for policy-makers to help them determine the
‘right’ selection criteria, given the preferences and the budget constraints of a certain
municipality.
In section 4.1 we describe the characteristics of the sample, the variables used, and the
selection criteria adopted in the six Italian municipalities. We also describe the differences
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between the potential users selected by different selection criteria. In section 4.2 we esti-
mate the impact of different sets of selection criteria on the financial contributions of fami-
lies to the cost of childcare. In section 4.3, we simulate the gains in maternal employment
and child development that result from offering childcare slots to different potential users.
In section 4.4, we repeat the exercise with two different scenarios: with an acceptance rate
of 25% (when rationing is stricter), and with an acceptance rate of 75% (when rationing is
weaker). Finally, in section 4.5 we show how this simulation framework can be used by
policy-makers to determine which selection criteria can help them reach their objectives,
given their financial constraints.
4.1 Selection criteria and users’ characteristics
For our empirical analysis, we use data from the Italian part of the European Survey on
Living and Income Conditions (EU-SILC) for the year 2010. The EU-SILC is a European
harmonized survey conducted by Eurostat that allows for the comparison of numerous so-
cial and economic dimensions across several European countries. Information is collected
at both the household and the individual levels. At the household level, we have informa-
tion on the number of family members and their relationships to each other, their main
demographic characteristics, their sources of income, their levels of deprivation, and their
household conditions. At the individual level, we have detailed information about each per-
son’s employment, income, education, and access to childcare.
We select 1210 households with at least one child less than 3 years old. Table 1 displays
the average characteristics of the sample, while details on how the variables are constructed
from the original information in EU-SILC are reported in Appendix 2. Among the families
in the sample, 52% of the mothers and 82% of the fathers are employed (with 34–43 aver-
age weekly hours). Both parents are employed in only 45% of the families. The average
number of siblings aged less than 18 years in each family is 0.7, and 12% of children are liv-
ing in a single-parent household. In almost 2% of the households at least one family mem-
ber has serious health limitations; while in almost 4% of the households the family had
been in arrears on utility bills in the past 12 months, did not have adequate home heating,
or faced structural problems. From this point onwards we will refer to these families as
‘households at risk of social exclusion’.
Using the information available in the EU-SILC, we calculate for the same sample of
families the points each family would be assigned according to different selection criteria
adopted in six Italian municipalities—Turin, Milan, Bologna, Reggio Emilia, Rome, and
Naples (see Appendix 1). For each set of selection criteria, we then rank the families from
the highest number of points (highest priority) to the lowest number of points (lowest prior-
ity), and assign a slot to the first 605 children, based on an acceptance rate of 50%. This
process allows us to distinguish between six potentially different populations of users.
Table 2 describes the characteristics of the families selected according to the different selec-
tion criteria: namely, parental employment, family circumstances, members’ health, and so-
cial disadvantages. Figure 1 graphically represents some of the more relevant areas of
heterogeneity.
All of the sets of selection criteria used by the Italian municipalities give additional
weight to families in which both parents work: the share of these families who are assigned
a slot is 69% in Bologna, 68% in Rome, 78% in Milan, 80% in Reggio Emilia, and 86% in
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Naples. In Turin, however, the weight assigned is relatively small, leading only to 48% of
selected families with both parents working. Instead, Turin assigns greater weight to fami-
lies headed by a single parent, and to families in which one parent is looking for a job.
Turin also gives priority to larger families: in 60% of the families selected the child attend-
ing childcare has at least one sibling (compared with 40% in the other municipalities), and
in 20% of the families selected the child attending childcare has more than one sibling
(compared with 10% in the other municipalities). The percentage of families selected who
are headed by a single parent is particularly high in Bologna and in Rome (24%). However,
no difference is observed across the municipalities in terms of the percentage of families se-
lected who have members with serious health limitations (the most important criterion in
all of the municipalities). Finally, the criteria applied in Turin, Bologna, and Rome seem to
Table 1. EU-SILC sample
Variable
Single-headed family household (%) 12.1
Siblings (0–18) 0.7
Mother employed (%) 52.2
Mother’s weekly hours of work 33.7
Mother unemployed (%) 10.7
Father employed (%) 82.1
Father’s weekly hours of work 42.7
Father unemployed (%) 5.6
Both parents employed (%) 45.0
Only one parent employed (%) 44.1
Social exclusion (%) 3.5
Observations 1,210
Table 2. Users according to different selection criteria
Acceptance rate 50% Turin Milan Bologna Reggio
Emilia
Rome Naples
Single-headed family household (%) 17.8 13.4 24.1 12.6 24.1 12.7
Siblings (0–18) 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6
Both parents employed (%) 48.1 77.5 69.4 79.5 68.4 85.8
One parent employed (%) 41.3 17.8 17.1 20.2 17.7 13.7
At least one parent employed (%) 89.4 97.5 86.6 99.7 86.1 99.5
At least one parent unemployed (%) 7.9 2.5 2.0 0.5 2.0 0.5
At least one parent actively
looking for a job (%)
20.3 11.4 9.3 2.1 9.2 1.3
At least one parent student (%) 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
Social exclusion (%) 6.9 2.1 6.9 3.8 6.9 1.8
Disposable income (E) 35,784 41,343 33,056 41,489 38,894 39,300
Below poverty threshold (%) 22.3 11.24 18.51 9.42 17.52 7.93
Monthly fee (E) 264 222 196 322 128 177
Observations 605
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select more families at risk of social exclusion (around 7%) than the criteria applied in
Milan, Reggio Emilia, and Naples (around 2–4%).
Generally, we can observe that municipalities such as Turin, Bologna, and Rome give
priority to more disadvantaged families than cities such as Milan, Reggio Emilia, and
Naples. When we look at Table 2, we can also see that the percentage of poor families who
are selected is higher in the first three cities (18–22%) than in the last three cities (8–11%).
To ensure the reliability of our simulation setting, we test our model by comparing our
simulations with real data provided by the municipality of Turin. We have information about
all of the families who applied for public childcare, and about the families who were assigned
a slot in the school year 2010–2011. Table 3 provides a descriptive analysis of the two sam-
ples of interest: the whole population (our EU-SILC sample and the real applicants in the mu-
nicipality of Turin), and the potential/real users of the service (the potential users based on
EU-SILC data with Turin’s selection criteria, and the real users in the municipality of Turin).
The top panel of Table 3 shows the remarkable similarity between the two populations:
all of their characteristics are roughly the same in terms of absolute value. In terms of differ-
ences in means, the number of siblings, the proportion of parents employed and the per-
centage of families experiencing social exclusion are significantly different in the two
groups. The number of siblings is significantly lower in Turin, although the difference is al-
most negligible in absolute value. This difference is related to the heterogeneity of average
family size across Italian regions. Also the proportion of parents employed displays a higher
value in the case of Turin. This may be reasonable given the fact that working parents are
more likely to apply for childcare, as for them reconciling family and work duties is crucial.
EU-SILC data contain a representative sample of the whole populations, while the sample
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Figure 1. Household characteristics in different municipalities.
Notes: The characteristics of the users are simulated according to different selection criteria.
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of Turin is only made by those individuals applying for a public childcare slot. The arising
difference in the percentage of families experiencing social exclusion is likely to be driven
by two reasons. First, the definition used in the EU-SILC data set to construct the variable
for social exclusion needs to be considered as a proxy for the actual variable. Second, fami-
lies experiencing social exclusion are likely to be over-represented in the actual population
of Turin as social exclusion is one of the most relevant criteria to obtain a place in the pub-
lic childcare system—see also Appendix 1. The comparison between the simulated and the
actual users is reported in the bottom part of Table 3. As a consequence of the selection
process based on Turin’s selection criteria the two samples become even more similar. As
expected, we find that there are still more working parents in the Turin sample than in the
EU-SILC data. There are also more siblings in Turin, which—as previously said—could be
due to a different distribution of children in Turin than in the rest of the country. Social ex-
clusion is the same in the two populations. Interestingly, the actual monthly fee is not statis-
tically different from the simulated fee.
4.2 Selection criteria and financial contribution to the service
In the Italian childcare system, families pay a fee according to their score on the Indicator of
the Equivalent Economic Situation (ISEE). This indicator, which is obtained using informa-
tion available in the EU-SILC data, measures the economic well-being of families based on
their income, property, assets, and family composition. While we need to make approxima-
tions when using the ISEE (see Appendix 3 for details), the measure seems to be quite reliable,
at least for our purposes. Indeed, at the bottom of Table 3, in which we compare the popula-
tion of Turin and our sample using Turin’s selection criteria, we observe that the average
simulated fee is 251 euros, while the real average fee paid by Turin users is 259 euros.
Table 3. Validation of the simulation setting (comparison with real data)
Whole population EU-SILC Turin P-value for
difference in means
Single-headed family household (%) 12.07 12.20 0.90
Siblings (0–18) 0.68 0.56 0.00
Both parents employed (%) 45.04 53.61 0.00
At least one parent with health limitations (%) 1.73 2.34 0.20
Social exclusion (%) 3.47 5.37 0.01
Observations 1,210 4,564
Users EU-SILC Turin P-value for
difference in means
Single-headed family household (%) 14.99 14.93 0.97
Siblings (0–18) 1.17 0.77 0.00
Both parents employed (%) 51.32 58.26 0.00
At least one parent with health limitations (%) 3.70 4.03 0.72
Social exclusion (%) 7.41 8.44 0.42
Monthly fee (E) 251 259 0.45
Observations 567 2,156
Notes: Comparison between the EU-SILC sample and the population of real applicants in Turin (top part of
the table); comparison between potential users in the EU-SILC sample (by adopting Turin’s selection criteria
and acceptance rate) and the population of real users in Turin (bottom part of the table).
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To predict how much the users selected would contribute under different selection crite-
ria, we impute the fee according to their ISEE score. We apply the fee scheme adopted by
Turin, although the results are also robust when we apply the other municipalities’
schemes. Given these prices, the families in our sample are assumed to be willing to pay for
a slot in public childcare, and therefore apply for one.
Figure 2 shows the average fee per child when the children are selected according to dif-
ferent selection criteria.
We observe that the households with a child attending childcare pay an average of 260
euros per month in Turin and Bologna, around 300 euros in Rome, and more than 300
euros per month in the three remaining municipalities.6 The different selection criteria af-
fect the financial contributions of the households, which may have large implications for
the economic sustainability of the services.
4.3 Selection criteria, maternal employment, and child development
We now turn to the simulation of the benefits of childcare for maternal employment and
child development levels. To simulate the effects of childcare on maternal employment, we
use the estimates reported in Appendix 4. The impact of previously available childcare on
maternal employment is positive and significant, but hides strong heterogeneities. Indeed,
Figure 2. Selection criteria and financial contribution to childcare.
Notes: Simulated monthly fee (in euros) per child care slot.
6 The values are very close to those provided by the Cittadinanzattiva observatory of prices and tar-
iffs (2009) when considering a hypothetical family composed of three people (parents plus one child
aged 0–3 years) with an annual gross income of around 44,000 euros; for more information, see
www.cittadinanzattiva.it.
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the overall positive effect is driven by mothers who were not working at the time their child
first started attending childcare.7
Figure 3A shows the gains in maternal employment that result when 50% of the demand
for childcare services is met, compared to when no childcare services are available. Maternal
employment is 7.2% higher under Turin’s criteria and 5.2% higher under Bologna’s criteria.
The increases are much smaller under the selection criteria used by the other municipalities.
Shifting to child development, we consider two outcomes: the preference for reading
and pro-social behaviour. Having attended childcare increases the probability that the child
will like to read, and has a positive impact on the child’s pro-social behaviour. The benefits
are again heterogeneous: the effect on expressing a preference for reading is stronger among
children with non-employed parents, children living in single-parent households, and chil-
dren with siblings; while the effect on pro-social behaviour is stronger for children from
single-headed family households and children without siblings.8 Figure 3B shows that gains
in the percentage of children who like to read are higher when the selection criteria of
Turin, Bologna, and Rome are adopted. This result could be explained by the fact that these
three cities select more single-headed family households and fewer working families.
Figure 3C replicates the exercise for the case of pro-social behaviour. The increase in the
pro-social behaviour score appears to be smaller under Turin’s criteria, as families with a
Figure 3. (A) Selection criteria and gain in maternal employment. (B) Selection criteria and gains in child
development (like reading). (C) Selection criteria and gains in child development (pro-social behaviour).
7 The results are in line with those of previous studies that found a positive impact of childcare on
mother’s employment. Brilli et al. (2015) found that a 1 percentage point increase in child care avail-
ability raises the maternal employment rate by 1.3 percentage points.
8 The estimated effects are in line with the results from other studies (Havnes and Mogstad 2011,
2014 and Felfe et al. 2012) and confirm the hypothesis that early formal care is more important for
disadvantaged families.
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greater number of siblings are more likely to be selected. The increase in the score is, how-
ever, higher under the criteria of Bologna and Rome, as families with only one child are more
likely to be selected. As the simulation of the gains in the two different child outcomes shows,
there are no ‘right’ selection criteria; or, in other words, what the ‘right’ selection criteria are
depends on the preference each municipality has for one potential outcome over the other.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
All of the simulations carried out so far assume an acceptance rate of 50%. This figure is ra-
ther close to the rate observed in the municipality of Turin (47%), and can be a good
benchmark to start with. Without estimating the demand function, which would allow us
to determine how many families would apply for a slot, and to compare them with the
number of available slots, it is very difficult to provide a reliable measure. In fact, even if
we could find out how many families have applied in each municipality, we would still
have to assume that many families would like to secure a public childcare slot, but do not
apply because they know that, given the selection criteria, they would not be assigned a
slot. Thus, an acceptance rate of 50% can be considered biased upwards.
We propose other alternative scenarios: the first uses an acceptance rate of 25% while
the second uses an acceptance rate of 75%. Figures 4 and 5 highlight the results.
With an acceptance rate of 25% (Figure 4) the overall benefits to society are obviously
smaller: child development levels are lower and fewer mothers participate in the labour mar-
ket. The differences across the different sets of selection criteria are more polarized: compared
to the criteria of other municipalities, the criteria of Bologna and Turin are associated with
greater benefits for maternal employment. Bologna’s and Rome’s criteria are linked to better
child development outcomes. With an acceptance rate of 75% (Figure 5), the overall benefits
increase, and the differences across the municipalities’ criteria almost disappear.
4.5 A simple simulation exercise
We now discuss how this simulation model may be used by policy-makers, and provide
some examples. Obviously, a policy-maker could look at the estimated benefits of childcare
(based on empirical evidence from the vast literature on this subject) for outcomes other
than reading, pro-social behaviour, and maternal employment.
Suppose a municipality needs a minimum average of 220 euros per child for its childcare
services to be financially sustainable, and to achieve its goal of maximizing mothers’ em-
ployment. What selection criteria should be adopted? If, for example, the municipality
awarded each family two points if the parents have been recently unemployed, one point if
the mother is working at the time of application, one point if the household is headed by a
single parent, and three points if the child has siblings, the municipality would realize a 6.0
percentage point increase in the number of children who like to read, a 3.5% increase in
pro-social behaviour, and an 8.3 percentage point increase in mothers’ employment.
If instead the municipality wants to maximize the number of children who like to read,
what selection criteria should be adopted? If, for example, the municipality awarded each
family three points if the parents have been recently unemployed, one point if the mother is
working at the time of application, three points if the household is headed by a single par-
ent, and two points if the child has siblings, the municipality would realize a 7.5 percentage
point increase in the number of children who like to read, a 4.6% increase in pro-social be-
haviour, and a 7.3 percentage point increase in mothers’ employment.
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Figure 4. The effect of selection criteria with a 25% acceptance rate
Figure 5. The effect of selection criteria with a 75% acceptance rate
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If the municipality needs a minimum average of 250 euros per child, it has to assign two
points if the parents have been recently unemployed, three points if the mother is working
at the time of application, two points if the household is headed by a single parent, and one
point if the child has siblings. In this example, the municipality would realize a 7.0 percent-
age point increase in the number of children who like reading, a 5.3% increase in pro-social
behaviour, and a 2.1 percentage point increase in mothers’ employment.
Finally, if the municipality needs a minimum average of 250 euros per child and can
only provide access to childcare services to 25% of children, it has to assign one point if the
parents have been recently unemployed, two points if the mother is working at the time of
application, three points if the household is headed by a single parent, and one point if the
child has siblings. In this example, the municipality would realize a 4.8 percentage point in-
crease in the number of children who like reading, a 3.0% increase in pro-social behaviour,
and a 1.3 percentage point increase in mothers’ employment.
5 Conclusions
Our study explores the impact of selection criteria on the costs and benefits of early child-
care for mothers’ employment, child development, and municipalities’ revenues by exploit-
ing selection criteria variability across different Italian municipalities.
Our results have interesting policy implications. The benefits for child outcomes and
mothers’ employment are, as expected, shown to be stronger in contexts in which the selec-
tion criteria give priority to more disadvantaged households. However, in these contexts
the selected households contribute less to the financial sustainability of the service. There is
a trade-off between the benefits to the households and the costs faced by the municipalities.
The most evident limitation of this study is that we are not able to estimate the demand
side. If we had access to information on how much families are willing to pay for a slot in a
public childcare centre, we would be able to estimate who would be likely to apply at cer-
tain prices, and given certain selection criteria.
In addition, we are making two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that there are
no peer effects between children in childcare centres. If there are such effects, the greater
benefits observed in the municipalities that give priority to disadvantaged children are posi-
tively biased. Our second assumption, which is probably less problematic, is that parental
behaviours (work, divorce, fertility) are not influenced by the selection criteria themselves.
Finally, we compare the benefits to children and mothers across municipalities without
taking into account the possibility of attending private childcare. If we assume that children
from more advantaged families who are excluded from the public system can afford private
childcare, that there are no peer effects, and that the benefits of attending private childcare
are similar to those of attending public childcare, then we are underestimating the positive
benefits of giving public slots to more disadvantaged children.
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Appendix 1: Selection criteria
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Appendix 2: Variables description (EU-SILC)
Appendix 3: ISEE calculations
We have constructed the ISEE indicator using the available information about the household in
the EU-SILC data set, and following an approach similar to the one used in Bucciol et al. (2014).9
The ISEE is an ‘Indicator of the Economic Equivalent’ Situation of the family’. It was
created to ensure that we have a comparable measure of economic well-being for families
based on their income, property, assets, and number of members.
The ISEE is composed of a weighted sum of two different indicators. The first indicator
is the so-called ISR (Indicatore della Situazione Reddituale), which measures income flows
from different sources received by the household in the previous fiscal year. The second fac-
tor is an estimation of the value of the property (see Figari et al., 2012)., assets, and capital
owned by the family. Therefore, ISEE for household h is defined in the following way:
Age children From 1 to 3
Siblings Number of siblings in the household
Household size Number of members in the household
Single-headed family household Only one parent in the household (1), otherwise (0)
Mother’s activity 7 dummy variables: full-time worker, part-time worker, unemployed,
student, domestic tasks, disable, inactive
Father’s activity 7 dummy variables: full-time worker, part-time worker, unemployed,
student, domestic tasks, disable, inactive
Working hours per week Number of hours worked per week
Looking for a job The individual is looking for a job (1), otherwise (0)
Work availability The individual is available to work (1), otherwise (0)
Past activities Work activities in the last 12 months
Tertiary education Tertiary education attained (1), otherwise (0)
Health limitation Activity limitation because of health problem (1), otherwise (0)
Serious health limitation Activity strongly limited because of health problem (1), otherwise (0)
Leaking roof Leaking roof (1), otherwise (0)
Arrears on utility bills The household has been in arrears on utility bills in the last 12 months
(1), otherwise (0)
House adequately heated Household unable to keep the house adequately heated (1), otherwise
(0)
Poverty indicator The household is at risk of poverty (1), otherwise (0)
Monthly rent dwelling Current monthly rent related to occupied accommodation in E
Tenure status The individual is the accommodation owner (1), the tenant is paying
rent at the prevailing or market rate (2), the tenant is paying at a
reduced rate (3), accommodation provided for free (4)
Interest Interest, dividends, profits from capital investments in E
Total gross household income Total household gross income in E
Equivalized disposable income Equivalized disposable income in E
Monthly disposable income Monthly disposable income in E
9 A detailed explanation of the variables used to construct ISEE indicator is available upon request.
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Iseeh ¼
Xn
j¼1 Yj þ Pj þ rW
M
j D1
 
þ 0:2 
Xn
j¼1 W
I
j D2WIj
 
þ 0:2 
Xn
j¼1 W
M
j D3WMj
 
pðs; cÞ
in which n is the size of household h. Y and P are income measures, while WM are the
aggregate financial assets owned by the family, and r is the interest rate.10 WI is an estima-
tion of the value of property assets, such as the primary and the secondary residences. The
denominator p(s, c) is a weight computed as a function of household size (s) and other char-
acteristics (c), such as the age of household components and health problems.
Appendix 4: Formal childcare and mothers’ labour supply
Our goal is to investigate the heterogeneous effects of childcare provision on mothers’ work
decisions. We utilize a data set from a survey on three cities of the North of Italy, in which
a complete set of information about household characteristics and children outcomes is col-
lected. The survey was conducted in 2013, and involves five who have been interviewed in
Table A1. Demand and supply of formal childcare
Supply side
Score 0.112**
(0.044)
Constant 1.246
(0.908)
Demand side
Distance from formal childcare centre 0.088**
(0.044)
Single-headed family household 0.371*
(0.223)
Closeness to grandparents 0.493***
(0.148)
Migrant 0.761***
(0.162)
Constant 0.860***
(0.167)
Athrho 2.761
(56.836)
Wald v2 36.44
q 0.992
(0.902)
N 421
Dependent variables: Indicator variable for being offered a slot in the formal child care system (Supply side);
Indicator variable for demanding a slot in the formal child care system (Demand side). Partial observability
bivariate probit. Standard errors in the two equations are jointly normally distributed.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates signifi-
cance at 5% level, * indicates significance at 10% level.
10 The interest rate applied to financial assets is the state bond interest rate.
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different Italian cities. We exploit information from the survey carried out on the cohort of
children born in 2006 who were interviewed together with their parents. The dependent
variable is the working condition of the mother when the child is 7 years old. We are inter-
ested in the effect of early childcare attendance on the mother’s work status (when the child
is aged 7 years), and in testing whether the effect is different between mothers who were
working/not working during their child’s pre-school years (ideally, at the moment of appli-
cation for early childcare). We are able to control for a large number of household charac-
teristics: the age (in months) and the gender of the child, the presence of younger or older
siblings, whether the parents have a tertiary education, the mother’s IQ, whether the house-
hold is headed by a single parent, whether the family owns their own home, and whether
the parents are immigrants.
Table A2. Heterogeneous effects of formal childcare on mothers’ employment
(1) (2) (3)
Mother not
employed
when child
aged 3 years
Mother employed
when child
aged
3 years
Whole sample
Formal childcare (FCC) 0.253*** 0.032 0.278***
(0.057) (0.035) (0.048)
FCC*Mother employedchild 3 0.334***
(0.067)
Mother employedchild 3 0.475***
(0.049)
Male 0.070 0.013 0.005
(0.059) (0.037) (0.035)
Age 0.034 0.095* 0.088*
(0.078) (0.049) (0.045)
Siblings 0.279*** 0.076** 0.128***
(0.076) (0.038) (0.040)
Tertiary education, mother 0.062 0.089** 0.061
(0.070) (0.044) (0.042)
Tertiary education, father 0.116* 0.073 0.024
(0.068) (0.049) (0.044)
IQ score 0.380*** 0.121** 0.031
(0.119) (0.060) (0.062)
Single-headed family household 0.207 0.043 0.154**
(0.130) (0.064) (0.066)
House owner 0.161** 0.003 0.072*
(0.069) (0.037) (0.037)
Migrant 0.136* 0.027 0.173***
(0.075) (0.049) (0.044)
N 243 257 500
R2 0.333 0.264 0.349
Dependent variable: Mother’s employment when the child is aged 7 years.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5%
level, * indicates significance at 10% level.
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To address the endogeneity of the early childcare attendance decision, we use a propen-
sity score matching method. We match treated children with untreated children with a close
degree of probability of demanding early childcare and a close degree of probability of
being offered early childcare if they were to apply. We first estimate a partial observability
model, whereby the supply of early childcare depends on the admission criteria (in scores),
and the demand depends on the distance to the closest public childcare centre, living in a
household headed by a single parent, having grandparents who live nearby, and the family’s
immigrant status. The errors in the two equations are jointly normally distributed. We find
that the supply positively depends on the scores as defined by the admission criteria.
Meanwhile, the distance to the closest childcare centre, having grandparents who live
nearby, and having parents who are immigrants have a negative impact on the demand;
and living in a household headed by a single parent has a positive impact on the demand
(Table A1). We therefore predict the probability of wanting to have a childcare place
according to the family characteristics, and we predict the probability of being offered a
slot depending on the score all families would get if they applied for a childcare place. We
have a treatment group of 242 units (children in childcare at ages 0–2 years) and 179 poten-
tial control units (children not in childcare at ages 0–2 years). We match each treated child
with one untreated child with the closest probability of being offered a slot and the closest
probability of demanding childcare at ages 0–2 years (with replacement).
We employ a linear probability model. The three columns in Table A2 show the esti-
mated coefficients: we find a positive association between having a childcare slot and moth-
er’s work when the child is age 7 years among mothers who were not working in the child’s
pre-school years (Column 1). We find no significant association for mothers who were pre-
viously working (Column 2).
Appendix 5: Formal childcare and children’s outcomes
Our goal is to investigate the potential heterogeneous effects of formal childcare on children’s
outcomes. We use the same data and the same methodology as in the Appendix 4. Our de-
pendent variables are related to the child’s attitudes toward reading and to his/her behaviour
with friends. The first is the answer ‘yes/no’ to the question ‘Do you like reading?’. The se-
cond is the score (from 0 to 10, whereby 10 indicates the highest pro-social behaviour) as-
signed to answers to five questions asked of the mother. The questions are designed to assess
whether the child is considerate of others’ feelings; shares readily with others; is helpful if
someone is hurt, upset, or ill; is kind to younger children; and often volunteers to help others.
We estimate a linear probability model both for the outcome related to reading and for the
one concerning pro-social behaviour. We are interested in the effect of early childcare attendance
and in testing whether the effect is different for children living in a couple- or a single-headed
household, with or without parental unemployment parent, and with or without siblings.
We observe (Table A3) a positive effect of early childcare on the reading attitudes of
children from disadvantaged backgrounds (that is, children who live in a single-parent
family, in a large family, or in a family in which the parents are unemployed). We also
observe (Table A4) a positive effect on pro-social behaviour for all sub-groups of chil-
dren, and particularly for children who live in a single-headed household or who have
no siblings.
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